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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a supply-demand model for the public sector, mea-
sured as governments’ tax revenues divided by GDP. We use a political equi-
librium with a rule of majority. The model takes into account inefficiencies
caused by taxes and includes costs associated with public goods provision
to consumers. We show that the size of the public sector depends on the
median voter’s income, size of population, costs associated with taxpaying,
and quality of institutions, which reflect costs of public goods provision. The
estimates for the OECD countries (2000-2017), using dynamic panel model
techniques, are in line with the theoretical predictions; however, they do not
confirm Wagner’s law. Our estimates suggest that the size of the govern-
ment sector grows as income increases, but at a slower rate. We show that
the quality of institutions matters: a more effective government raises the
share of public sector; better regulations, which permit and promote private
sector development, reduce it.
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1 Introduction
The objectives of the public sector are to provide agents with public goods,
perform redistributive policies, smooth economic cycles and set rules and
regulations for the private sector. At an appropriate size and structure, the
public sector can enhance agents’ prosperity and economic growth, and as a
consequence, academic researchers and policy makers closely study the de-
terminants of optimality of size and structure. An important characteristic
of government intervention in an economy is the tax burden. In this pa-
per, we develop a supply-demand model for the tax burden with a political
equilibrium based on the rule of majority. The model provides us with a
theoretical approach for testing Wagner’s law, which states that the share of
public sector in an economy expands with economic growth (Wagner 1883;
Wagner 1892). Our estimates for OECD countries do not confirm this law:
although the absolute size of the public sector grows when income increases,
its rate of growth is substantially lower than the growth of income. But, in
general, the empirical estimates accord with our theoretical predictions.
There were no models to explain the determinants of the size of the pub-
lic sector for a long time. Classical economists, such as Adam Smith put
their efforts into descriptions of common long-lasting trends; however, no
attempts were made to generalize observations into one theory (Tarschys
1975). The first simple theory to explain the size of the public sector was
proposed by Adolph Wagner. He was the first economist who noticed a pos-
itive correlation between the level of economic development and the share
of public sector. Wagner’s law is still relevant nowadays. If, in a democratic
country, Wagner’s law is valid, this strengthens the theories expressed by
Piketty (Piketty 2014; Piketty 2015), who noticed that economic growth
leads to growing inequality and argued in favor of progressive taxes. If
Wagner’s law is not valid, it is worthwhile to find out why. One explana-
tion could be that democratic regimes are not efficient in monitoring voters’
preferences. If this is not the case, it could be that voters do not demand
a larger share of public goods in their consumption. The later case would
be a strong argument against economic populism, an approach which em-
phasizes income distribution and deemphasizes finance deficits and inflation
(Dornbusch and Edwards 1990; Pereira and DallAcqua 1991).
There are numerous works devoted to testing Wagner’s law. The main
testing approach is based on an estimation of an econometric model and tests
whether an increase in GDP per capita (or GDP) leads to an enlargement
or subtraction of the public sector’s share of the GDP. A number of works
confirm the law (Lamartina and Zaghini 2011; Magazzino, Giolli, and Mele
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2015; Atasoy and Gu¨r 2016), the others do not (Moore 2016; Afonso and
Alves 2017; Funashima and Hiraga 2017; Jalles 2019). An analysis of very
long time series for Sweden and the UK reveals that Wagner’s law was valid
between roughly 1860-1970, but does not support the law for the periods
before 1860 and after 1970 (Durevall and Henrekson 2011). By contrast,
Italian data suggest that Wagner’s law for aggregate expenditure was valid
for the second half of the 19th century only (Pistoresi et al. 2017).
Economic growth may also affect the structure of government expendi-
tures. The usual result is that a few types of government expenditures, such
as capital formation, rise more than proportionally as the economy grows,
while the share of most other expenditures declines (Courakis et al. 1993,
Chletsos and Kollias 1997, Akitoby et al. 2006, Magazzino 2012). The tax
composition of governments’ revenues changes as well (Mahdavi 2008).
A number of economists contrast Wagner’s law to the theories of Keynes,
who claimed that government expenditures can serve as a policy tool, and,
hence, are exogenous. Therefore, a number of works test Granger causality
between government expenditures and economic growth (Berry and Lowery
1987; Katrakilidis and Tsaliki 2009; Irandoust 2019; Sedrakyan and Varela-
Candamio 2019). The results are mixed, but most works find that causality
runs from economic development to government expenditures.
A large strand of literature focuses on other determinants of the size
of the public sector. One of the first in this field was Hinrichs (1965),
who argued that the most important determinant of the tax burden on the
economy is its openness (imports share to GDP). Empirical estimates sug-
gested that openness was very important for poor countries, while economic
growth weakened this link. These results were updated by Shin (1969),
who reported the significant influence of both the openness of economies
and GNP per capita, population growth and the degree of industrialization.
Other works of that period studied either the impact of various indicators
of economic development, such as income per capita and a share of agricul-
ture in GDP, or structural variables which affect the size of the tax base.
Nevertheless, Weiss (1969) emphasized that apart from purely economic de-
terminants, social, political and cultural aspects affecting agent’s readiness
to pay taxes should also be considered. Kelley (1976) stressed the role of
demographic factors: population size and density, and age structure. Pop-
ulation size affects the relative size of the public sector via economies of
scale, and diseconomies of scale arising from congestion and the rising costs
of communication. Similarly, the structure of the population affects the size
of the public sector via shifting the demand for public goods and services
toward the needs of the relatively expanding age cohorts.
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One of the first works that applied a complex approach to the determi-
nants of the size of the public sector was that of Chenery et al. (1975). The
main goal of their work was to find common indicators for all countries that
affect the structure of economies. They noted that as income grows the tax
burden on the economy is more affected by the demand for public goods and
political preferences than the limits of the tax base and the need to balance
the budget.
Nowadays, empirical research focuses on combinations of factors affect-
ing demand and supply of public goods. For example, Mahdavi (2008), with
data for developing countries, studied a wide range of explanatory variables
which affect demand for public goods such as population structure and edu-
cation. The supply side was represented by the level of corruption, political
regime and a number of proxies capturing the costs of tax collection. Bird et
al. (2014) analyzed supply and demand sides for public sectors in develop-
ing countries too but focused on the quality of institutions. They concluded
that reliable political institutions increase the supply of public goods, raising
agents’ willingness to pay taxes.
The size of the public sector was also extensively studied from a formal
‘mathematical’ modeling perspective. Early works in this field looked for
optimal quantities of public goods and realistic tools for finding optimality
(Samuelson 1954; Lindahl 1958). These works created a formal analytical
framework to model the demand for public goods and the main concepts - the
concept of public goods referring to pure non-excludable public goods. The
concept was generalized by Ellickson (1973) who allowed for their overuse or
crowding. A general-equilibrium framework, which allows for public projects
with no linear or ordered structure, was proposed by Mas-Colell (1980)
who developed welfare theorems to the model with one private good and
a finite number of agents. The results were extended by Diamantaras and
Gilles (1996), who introduced many private goods to the model, and De
Simone and Graziano (2004), who generalized these results for an infinite-
dimensional space of private goods.
In our paper, we introduce a political equilibrium to the Mas-Colell
model. We develop a model with one public and one private good and in-
clude voting under majority rule. The result is a demand-supply model for
public goods, with an equilibrium determined by the median voter’s pref-
erences, size of population, and a number of institutional factors affecting
demand and supply of public goods.
Our empirical model focuses on the dynamics of developed (OECD)
countries. It allows for frictions in adjusting the level of public sector and
includes country-specific effects, which solve endogeneity problems arising
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from time-invariant omitted variables, such as different geographical loca-
tion, history and culture. Our results do not confirm Wagner’s law and
emphasize the quality of institutions. In contrast to Bird et al. (2014) our
estimates suggest that better institutions may reduce the share of the public
sector, if they promote development of the private sector.
2 Model
2.1 Demand for public goods
Suppose there are N agents in the model. Every individual i, i = 1, ..., N ,
maximizes her utility function Ui(·, ·), which depends on consumption of
private (Xi) and public (G) goods. We assume that the utility function is
strictly increasing and concave in both arguments. Public goods are non-
excludable and their amount is the same for all individuals; however, indi-
viduals’ private utilities may decline with the number of other individuals
who consume these public goods. We assume that public goods enter the
utility function as GN−α, where α ∈ [0,∞) is the parameter, which reflects
the crowding effect.
The consumers’ optimization problem is:
max
Xi,G
Ui(Xi, GN
−α), (1)
Xi + τiG = Yi, (2)
where Yi is individual gross income; τi is the tax burden (in terms of private
goods) agents pay for one unit of public goods, 0 < τiG < Yi. From the
individual’s point of view, τi is fixed and determined by the government.
It includes tax compliance costs, such as time spent for taxpaying. We
assume that compliance costs τ compi are proportional to taxes to be paid τ
1
i :
τ compi = f(I
d)τ1i . I
d reflects the quality of institutions, which determine the
tax system’s simplicity, such as time used to pay taxes. We suppose that a
larger Id corresponds to better institutions, and f ′(·) < 0.
τi = τ
1
i (1 + f(I
d)). (3)
The total sum of private taxes, which are used for public goods financing,
are equal to the price of one unit of public goods (pG):
N∑
i=1
τ1i = p
G. (4)
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Solving the optimization problem (1-2), agents receive the following individ-
ual demand function for public goods:
Gdi = G
d
i
( +
Yi,
-
τi,
-
N
)
. (5)
The individual demand function depends positively on the first argument:
an increase in agent’s income raises demand for public goods. The impact
of the second argument is negative: a higher price for public goods reduces
demand. The impact of the third argument is also negative as public goods
are shared with a larger number of people (crowding effect).
We assume that the society consists of individuals with different prefer-
ences, incomes and gross taxes, which are set by the government. Likewise,
the desired quantity of public goods is determined by a specific procedure
of public choice, by our assumption, majority rule.
The assumption about the utility function’s strict concavity implies that
the solution of agents’ optimization problem (5) is unique and single-peaked.
Furthermore, the choice of the size of the public sector is a one-dimensional
problem. Therefore, according to the median voter’s theorem, the equi-
librium amount of the public sector is determined by the voter with the
median net income (see Mueller 2003, section 5.3 for a formal proof). We
also assume that dτi/dYi < 1: the median voter also obtains the median
gross income. This condition ensures that agents who receive higher gross
income also receive higher net income. For simplicity, we also assume that
all individuals pay the same taxes for one unit of public goods: τ1i = N
−1pG,
i = 1, ..., N , then the demand for public goods is characterized by:
Gd = Gd
( +
Ym,
-
pG(1 + f(Id))
N
,
-
N
)
, (6)
where subtitle m corresponds to the median voter. The demand for public
goods increases with the median voter’s income, and declines with their
costs. The impact of the third argument is negative; however, the total
impact of N is unknown because N also affects the second argument of
the function. Furthermore, variations in population size may also alter the
median voter and Ym, as a consequence.
2.2 Supply of public goods
Total government expenditure on public goods depend on population size.
The outlay is of two parts: direct costs of producing or purchasing public
6
goods (Cd), and their provision to consumers. We suppose that total costs
are equal to C = g1(I
s)CdN
γ , where g1(·) is a function g′1(·) < 0, Is denotes
institutional factors, which affect total costs of public goods from the sup-
ply side. Is may be considered as the capability of government personnel,
complexity of bureaucratic procedures, corruption, expenditures for audit-
ing and prevention of tax evasion. Higher values of Is are associated with
better institutions and lower costs. Larger population size N increases the
total costs (γ ≥ 0) due to more costly public goods provision to consumers.
We suppose that the government employs labor and capital for public
goods production. Alternatively, it may buy these goods from private firms.
The production costs can be written as:
Cd =
J1∑
j=1
wjLj +
J2∑
j=1
rjKj , (7)
where summation is made across all production factors Lj (labor), Kj (cap-
ital); wj and rj denote factor costs. We assume that they are exogenous.
The analog of the production function is:
G = g2(I
s)F (L1...LJ1 ,K1...KJ2), (8)
where g2(·), g′2(·) > 0 is a function which accounts for the quality of institu-
tions Is, which characterise government efficiency. F () is a usual neoclassical
production function. The government minimizes the total costs of produc-
tion under the constraint that G ≥ G0, where G0 is the necessary amount
of public goods.
min
Lj ,Kj
g1(I
s)
( J1∑
j=1
wjLj +
J2∑
j=1
rjKj
)
Nγ , (9)
g2(I
s)F (L1...LJ1 ,K1...KJ2) ≥ G0. (10)
Denote the solution of this optimization problem as:
C = C(
-
Is,
+
G0,
+
N) (11)
An improvement in the quality of institutions brings a decline in the total
costs of public goods. Total costs rise with an increased quantity of public
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goods and an increase in population size. The costs are financed by taxes
C(
-
Is,
+
G0,
+
N) = G0p
G, or
pG =
C(
-
Is,
+
G0,
+
N)
G0
= Ps(
-
Is,
?
G0,
+
N). (12)
Under decreasing returns to scale in production, C(Is, G0, N) is convex in
G0. In this case, the price of one public good p
G increases in G0. The
opposite holds if returns to scale are increasing. Under constant returns to
scale, pG does not depend on G0. Better institutions I
s reduce the costs of
public goods production, and, hence, reduce the gross tax rate pG.
2.3 Equilibrium
Equations (6) and (12) can be solved for equilibrium values of G and pG.
Denote them as Geq and p
G
eq:
Geq = Geq(
+
Id,
+
Is,
+
Ym,
?
N) (13)
pGeq = p
G(
+
Id,
-
Is,
+
Ym,
?
N) (14)
First, assume decreasing returns to scale in production function. Fig-
ure 1 depicts demand and supply curves. A higher median voter’s income
Ym makes public goods more affordable for the median voter, shifting the
demand curve up. This raises both the quantity of public goods (Geq) and
their price per unit (pGeq). When the quality of institutions from the demand
side improves (Id grows), the demand curve turns upwards around its inter-
section point with the vertical axis. This effect is determined by the fact that
for every fixed level of G, the gross tax (including costs associated with tax
paying) for the median voter declines. Hence, the median voter can afford
more public goods. The price per unit grows as well. An improvement in
the quality of institutions from the supply side (an increase in Is) shifts the
supply curve down, as more public goods can be produced at lower costs.
This results in an increase in Geq and a decline in p
G
eq.
The impact of population size N is not clear in that N is present in the
second argument on the left side part of equation (6). A larger population
leads to an overuse of public goods, and also increases the tax base. As a
result, the total effect of N on the demand curve is ambiguous.
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Figure 1: Demand and supply curves: decreasing returns to scale
The effects of Id, Is, Ym and N were explained under the assumption
of decreasing returns to scale in public goods production. Under constant
returns to scale, the supply curve becomes horizontal. In this case, Geq
behaves as in the case of decreasing returns to scale, but shifts in the demand
curve do not affect pGeq. An improvement in I
s is analogous to the case with
decreasing returns to scale.
Under increasing returns to scale, the supply curve declines in G. If we
assume that it is flatter than the demand curve, Geq behaves similarly to
the case with decreasing returns to scale; however, the effects of changes in
Id and Ym on p
G
eq are the opposite. This can be seen from Figure 2 in the
appendix.
2.4 Share of taxes in total income
Equation (13) expresses the quantity of public goods; equation (14) describes
their price per unit in terms of collected taxes. Multiplying one equation by
the other, we receive an equation for the total amount of taxes collected for
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public goods financing:
TAXeq := pGeqGeq = TAXeq(
+
Id,
?
Is,
+
Ym,
?
N) (15)
Better institutional quality Id increases the total taxes under the assumption
that returns to scale are nonincreasing. If they are increasing, the total
impact is not clear (see equations (18-19) in the appendix). The impacts of
Is, Ym and N follow directly form equations (13) and (14).
In order to receive an equation more convenient for econometric analysis,
we divide equation (15) by NY¯ , where Y¯ denotes an average income in the
population. Therefore, NY¯ denotes total income received by agents in the
country. Having assumed that there is a direct link between the average
income and the income of the median voter Ym = ψ(Y¯ ), where ψ(·) is a
strictly increasing function we receive:
TAXeq
NY¯
:= TAXshare(
+
Id,
?
Is,
?
Y¯ ,
?
N). (16)
The left side of equation (16) denotes the share of taxes in total income. This
expression allows us to use the share of taxes in the GDP in the empirical
analysis.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
We analyze cross-country data of OECD countries (36 countries in total)
collected from two sources: World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI)
and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The data range is 2000-2017.
Our dependent variable is tax revenue (percent of GDP). According to
its definition “tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central gov-
ernment for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines,
penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds
and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative
revenue.” We focus on the central government’s tax revenues. Studying
regional taxation would require a completely different regional data analysis
to account for the peculiarities of specific regions.
We approximate the median voters’ income in the following way: first, we
multiplied the income share held by the third 20 percent of the population3
3This data are provided by WBDI.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
variables mean S.D. min max Source
TAX/GDP 19.17 7.066 1.230 38.519 WBDI
Median voter’s income 32305.9 20133.37 533.422 95173.1 WBDI, own calculations
GDP per capita 36698.23 21843.87 6933.6 111968.3 WBDI
Gini 32.448 5.397 23.7 52.8 WBDI
Time to pay taxes 188.87 99.92 50 866 WBDI
Population 34,194,738 56,016,500 281,205 325,719,178 WBDI
Dependency ratio 49.766 5.206 36.323 66.487 WBDI
Government effectiveness 1.3089 0.5574 -0.03 2.35 WGI
Regulatory quality 1.2810 0.4389 0.04 2.1 WGI
Control of corruption 1.2543 0.7996 -0.93 2.47 WGI
and GDP in constant prices, receiving the total income held by the third
20 percent of the population. Dividing this income by the corresponding
number of people, we receive an average income obtained by the third 20
percent of the population. The resulting values are used as a proxy for the
median voter’s income.
In our models we also use the following variables which reflect demand
for public goods: GDP per capita in 2010 prices, the Gini coefficient, time
to prepare and pay taxes (hours), population size and dependency ratio.
Dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of dependents - people younger
than 15 or older than 64 - to the working-age population.
The supply side reflects the quality of institutions. It includes govern-
ment effectiveness. It is defined as “the quality of public services, the qual-
ity of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” The second
variable is regulatory quality, which is defined as the “ability of the govern-
ment to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit
and promote private sector development.” The third variable is control of
corruption, which by definition “reflects perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private
interests.”. Theoretically, these variables have a range between -2.5 and 2.5.
Higher values of these variables correspond to better institutions. Variables
used in our analysis are summarized in table 1.
The data constitute an unbalanced panel. Median voter’s income and
the Gini coefficient contain many missing observations. WGI variables on
the quality of institutions contain a number of missing observations as well.
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3.2 Methodology
We estimate a dynamic panel model with fixed individual effects, applying
the usual Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). We use four
lags of the dependent variable as instruments. The dynamic lagged variable
has an economic interpretation. It reflects frictions in adjusting public poli-
cies. It is known that agents, including the median voter, often prefer the
status quo (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Brooks and Manza 2008;
Elmelund-Præstekær and Emmenegger 2013). An inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable into the model takes such behavior into account.
Our theoretical model is static, but before making empirical estima-
tions we consider time indexes. Government budgets are usually planned
in advance following economic development forecasts. State revenues and
expenditures for a specific year are usually set by parliaments before the
year begins. Therefore, it is wise to consider a model in which the share of
taxes in GDP at time t is determined by explanatory variables at time t− 1
- the period corresponding to the calendar year. For example, the functional
form can be the following:
log
(
TAXeqi,t
Ni,tY¯i,t
)
= β0,i + γ
TAXeqi,t−1
Ni,t−1Y¯i,t−1
+ β1I
d
i,t−1 + β2I
s
i,t−1 + β3 log Y¯i,t−1 + β4 logNi,t−1 + εi,t. (17)
where i is a country-specific index, β0,i - country-specific fixed effects. On the
right hand side of equation (17) we use logarithms of income and population
size. We also take a logarithm of time spent for taxpaying. The log-log
functional form simplifies the interpretation of the coefficients: If β3 > 0,
the Wagner’s law is confirmed. The case −1 < β3 < 0 indicates that public
goods are normal goods, while β3 < −1 corresponds to the case of inferior
public goods. An inclusion of lagged explanatory variables into the model
solves a number of endogeneity problems and allows us to refer to Granger
causality (Granger 1969).
We expect that the coefficient corresponding to the median voter’s in-
come is positive, because such a coefficient would correspond to Wagner’s
law. However, a negative coefficient is also in line with our theoretical model
(16). If the median voter’s income is replaced with GDP per capita and the
Gini coefficient, we expect a positive coefficient for GDP per capita (Wag-
ner’s law), and a negative for the Gini coefficient, since greater inequality
reduces the median voter’s income.
More time spent for taxpaying is likely to reduce demand for public
goods, because it is associated with additional costs, while the effect of pop-
ulation size is unknown. On one hand, larger population size is associated
with crowding and higher provision costs, on the other, it gives rise to lower
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per capita costs for public goods. We also control for the dependency ra-
tio and expect that a higher dependency ratio positively affects the size of
the public sector, due to a higher demand for redistributive policies. More
reliable governmental institutions increase demand for public goods, but re-
duces their price. Therefore, the overall effect of the variables “government
effectiveness”, “regulatory quality” and “control of corruption” is ambigu-
ous.
3.3 Results
Table 2 presents estimates of equation (17) when the logarithm of the me-
dian voter’s income is included as an explanatory variable. In the first
model, we also control for the logarithm of time spent for taxpaying. In the
second model, we add the logarithm of population size. The third model in-
cludes the dependency ratio. In models 4-6 we include factors which reflect
the quality of institutions: government effectiveness, regulatory quality and
corruption.
A higher median voter’s income reduces the size of the public sector,
with the corresponding coefficient always significant at the 10% significance
level. A 1 percent increase in the median voter’s income corresponds to a
0.12-0.14 percent short-run decline in the relative size of the public sector.
As in the dynamic panel models, changes in the explanatory variables also
have an influence via the lagged dependent variable; it is possible to show
that a permanent 1 percent increase in the median voter’s income will lead to
a 0.23-0.42 percent decline in the size of the public sector in the long run.4
A higher dependency ratio increases the size of the public sector due to
increasing demand for redistributive programs. A one point increase in the
dependency ratio corresponds to approximately a 0.6-0.8 percent short run
increase in the size of the public sector. The long run effects are estimated
to be slightly higher than 1 percent.
In models 5 and 6, government effectiveness and regulatory quality are
significant at reasonable significance levels. The more effective the govern-
ment, the more public goods agents empower the government to produce,
while better regulatory quality reduces the share of the public sector by
enabling a larger private sector role. The coefficients corresponding to the
time spent on taxpaying, size of population and control of corruption are
insignificant at 10 percent significance level.
4In model 1, for example, the long run effect can be obtained as -0.1437/(1-0.6545)=-
0.4159.
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Table 2: Dependent variable: log(TAX/GDP), fixed country-specific effects,
median voter’s income
regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6
log(TAX/GDP)t−1 0.6545∗∗∗ 0.6481∗∗∗ 0.4497∗∗∗ 0.4533∗∗∗ 0.4718∗∗∗ 0.4707∗∗∗
(0.0850) (0.1067) (0.1007) (0.1025) (0.1022) (0.1009)
log(median income)t−1 -0.1437∗∗ -0.1219∗ -0.1448∗∗ -0.1430∗∗ -0.1256∗ -0.1255∗
(0.0729) (0.0727) (0.0649) (0.0657) (0.0663) (0.0660)
log(Time for taxes)t−1 -0.0282 -0.0655 0.0057 0.0040 0.0103 0.0103
(0.0269) (0.0421) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0244) (0.0237)
log(Population)t−1 -0.3933 -0.4855 -0.4178 -0.3972 -0.3979
(0.2877) (0.3430) (0.3452) (0.3263) (0.3302)
Dependencyt−1 0.0064∗∗ 0.0080∗∗ 0.0076∗∗ 0.0076∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Government effectivenesst−1 0.0421 0.0594∗∗ 0.0593∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0276) (0.0262)
Regulatory Qualityt−1 -0.0602∗ -0.0601∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0372)
Control of corruptiont−1 0.0005
(0.0361)
Sargan test 0.7963 0.7644 0.9906 0.9902 0.9908 0.9909
AR(1) p-value 0.0006 0.0005 0.0085 0.0109 0.0071 0.0095
AR(2) p-value 0.4715 0.4805 0.4681 0.4363 0.4876 0.4882
N 246 246 246 246 246 246
∗ p < 0.1
∗∗ p < 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 significance level
In table 3, we present estimates of the model when the median voter’s
income is approximated by more usual variables: GDP per capita in con-
stant prices and the Gini coefficient. The negative effects of the GDP per
capita are estimated to be larger than those with the median voter’s income;
however, the Gini coefficient has no significant impact.
The major difference between the results presented in table 3 and those
in table 2 is that population size, which has a negative sign, became signifi-
cant in models 2-3 and 5 at the 10% significance level. In model 2, reported
in table 3, time spent on taxpaying is significant at the 10% significance
level: more time required to pay taxes reduces the size of the public sec-
tor. However, when more variables are controlled for, the regressor loses its
significance.
4 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we developed a supply-demand model for the public sector
with political equilibrium, determined by simple majority voting. The equi-
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Table 3: Dependent variable: log(TAX/GDP), fixed individual effects, GDP
and Gini coefficient
regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6
log(TAX/GDP)t−1 0.6243∗∗∗ 0.5965∗∗∗ 0.4584∗∗∗ 0.4672∗∗∗ 0.5421∗∗∗ 0.4860∗∗∗
(0.0984) (0.1195) (0.1245) (0.1240) (0.1072) (0.1228)
log(GDP/capita)t−1 -0.1940∗ -0.1699∗ -0.1595∗∗ -0.1619∗∗ -0.1447∗∗ -0.1427∗∗
(0.1040) (0,0952) (0.0778) (0.0763) (0.0661) (0.0696)
Ginit−1 0.0027 0.0030 0.0028 0.0029 0.0030 0.0034
(0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053)
log(Time for taxes)t−1 -0.00231 -0.0676∗ -0.0050 -0.0085 -0.0110 -0.0001
(0.0282) (0.0404) (0.0321) (0.0032) (0.0334) (0.0282)
log(Population)t−1 -0.5238∗ -0.6054∗ -0.5316 -0.4519∗ -0.5090
(0.3135) (0.3454) (0.3474) (0.2690) (0.3263)
Dependencyt−1 0.0073∗ 0.0070∗ 0.0052 0.0063
(0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0043)
Government effectivenesst−1 0.0421 0.0496∗ 0.0608∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0284) (0.0281)
Regulatory Qualityt−1 -0.0443 -0.0545∗
(0.0378) (0.0321)
Control of Corruptiont−1 -0.0117
(0.0371)
Sargan test 0.9844 0.9859 0.9861 0.9861 1 0.9796
AR(1) p-value 0.0026 0.0032 0.0087 0.0103 0.0046 0.0074
AR(2) p-value 0.376 0.375 0.3576 0.3345 0.3794 0.3742
N 252 252 252 252 252 252
∗ p < 0.1
∗∗ p < 0.05
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 significance level
librium size of the public sector depends on the median voter’s income,
population size and the quality of institutions which affect demand for pub-
lic goods and their supply. This theoretical model allows us to test Wagner’s
law in a supply-demand framework.
Our estimates do not confirm Wagner’s law for the OECD countries:
the government share in the economy declines with income. This effect
is lower if income is measured as the average income of the third 20% of
population and larger if it is measured as GDP per capita. Nevertheless,
public goods are normal goods, and their demand increases with income. In
a number of models, the size of the public sector increases in the dependency
ratio: a larger share of agents of nonworking age (youth and pensioners)
requires higher redistribution. The impact of time spent on taxpaying is
negative: it increases the costs of public goods and reduces their demand.
As a consequence, the size of the public sector declines. However, this result
is not robust because the corresponding coefficient is insignificant in most
of the models.
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A larger population leads to an overuse of public goods (crowding effect)
and increases provision costs; it raises their price and leads to a fall in
demand. Furthermore, a larger population size increases the tax base and
leads to lower per capita costs. Our estimates suggest that a reduction in
demand dominates the other effects, the overall effect of population on the
size of the public sector being negative. However, the resulting coefficient is
insignificant in a few model specifications.
The quality of institutions has diverse effects on the size of the public
sector: a more effective government measured by the quality of public and
civil services heightens demand for public goods and increases the size of the
public sector. Better regulatory quality, associated with better regulations
that permit and promote private sector development, has the opposite effect.
Our estimates reveal no significant effect of the control of corruption. It is
likely that better corruption control reduces the price of public goods and
has a negative impact on the size of the public sector, while an increased
demand affects the size of the public sector in the opposite way. The sum
of these two effects is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Our model addresses current trends in an attempt to explain them. The
results may be taken into account by policy-makers for the development and
implementation of policy reforms. For example, chapter 3 of the European
Pillar of Social Rights in 20 principles proposes a drastic increase in social
protection and inclusion. The implementation of these principles is associ-
ated with a significant growth in public sector. Our estimates suggest that
such an increase should be accompanied by economic growth. An increase in
the public sector relative to income may harm political equilibrium, however,
and cause a new wave of euro-skepticism, while a gradual implementation
of the principles supplemented by faster economic growth may garner more
public support.
In the future, our theoretical model can be expanded by endogenous in-
come and labor supply, which depend on tax rates, and, as a consequence, on
the size of the public sector. A research agenda can also focus on the demand
for redistributive policies, poverty reduction and risk sharing and investigate
if similar effects can be found in developing countries: CIS, MENA, Latin
America, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa. Such estimates may depict a
broader picture of Wagner’s law’s applicability and reveal other factors that
affect the size of the public sector. The usage of a lower level of aggregation
also seems to be promising.
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Figure 2: Demand and supply curves: increasing returns to scale
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